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Abstract
In many situations incentives exist to acquire knowledge and make correct political decisions. We conduct an
experiment that contributes to a small but growing literature on incentives and political knowledge, testing the
effect of certain and uncertain incentives on knowledge. Our experiment builds on the basic theoretical point that
acquiring and using information is costly, and incentives for accurate answers will lead respondents to expend
greater effort on the task and be more likely to answer knowledge questions correctly. We test the effect of
certain and uncertain incentives and find that both increase effort and accuracy relative to the control condition
of no incentives for accuracy. Holding constant the expected benefit of knowledge, we do not observe behavioral
differences associated with the probability of earning an incentive for knowledge accuracy. These results suggest
that measures of subject performance in knowledge tasks is contingent on the incentives they face. Therefore, to
ensure the validity of experimental tasks and the related behavioral measures we need to ensure a correspondence
between the context we are trying to learn about and our experimental design.
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Many political decisions happen in a context in which individuals face incentives to acquire
information and use it to make an inference about a future event. For example, voters have an
incentive to select the candidate that best represents their interests and desired policies, which
might be affected by knowledge about foreign trade, immigration, or international conflict. Voters
would therefore have an incentive to acquire information about these topics and use it to help
determine which candidate to support. In this simple example, which occurs regularly in politics,
there are incentives for accurate knowledge of the world, and yet few experiments have investigated
how incentives affect political knowledge. If incentives matter in these situations and we fail to
study their effects, then we may misunderstand behavior in many political contexts.
Prior research about political knowledge and behavior demonstrates that incentives can systematically affect people’s knowledge about domestic politics (Krupnikov et al., 2006; Prior and
Lupia, 2008). We extend research about incentives and knowledge by examining how uncertainty
in incentives affects knowledge. To do so, we examine knowledge questions for which the outcomes
have not yet occurred, and therefore answering these questions correctly requires a combination
of information about the current state of the world and the ability to make an inference about
how things will change five weeks into the future. We show that incentives increase respondents’
effort and accuracy in answering knowledge questions, and subjects behave similarly whether the
incentives are guaranteed or uncertain.
This paper contributes to the methodological literature focused on experimental design (Morton
and Williams, 2010). Good experimental design captures the essential elements of the theory being
tested, and if the underlying theory involves individuals having an incentive for accurate knowledge
or information acquisition, then our experiments need to include similar incentives. In their absence,
an experiment will not be a good match to the behavior being studied.
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Incentives, Effort, and Knowledge Accuracy

In this paper we examine the ability of voters to identify the correct answer to a question where
the outcome will not be known until a future, but not very distant, date. The ability to predict the
outcome of an event in which initial conditions are knowable but there is some uncertainty about the
future is a common, politically-relevant task (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Research demonstrates
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that incentives for accuracy improve the ability of people to correctly answer political knowledge
questions (Feldman, Huddy and Marcus, 2015; Prior and Lupia, 2008), and financial incentives
encourage subjects to update their beliefs about political facts (Hill, 2017).
We contribute to the literature on incentives and knowledge by studying both certain and
uncertain incentives. Research has generally used incentives where the payoffs for correct knowledge
occur with certainty; however, Hill (2017) does examine how probabilistic incentives affect learning.
In many political contexts incentives are uncertain and therefore understanding their effects is
important to learning about behavior. For example, acquiring accurate knowledge may not change
one’s vote with certainty, and even if it does affect a vote, the election outcome and its benefits are
uncertain. In either case the benefit of correct knowledge is uncertain and this uncertainty may
affect behavior.1 As elaborated below, we expect both certain and uncertain incentives to improve
knowledge accuracy because they both affect the expected benefits of knowledge, which should lead
to more correct answers.
Prior research has also focused on situations in which the correct answer to a question can be
identified relatively easily online or in a book. However, the questions we use in our experiment
(described in the next section) ask respondents to identify the right answer to a question when
the outcome will not be known for about five weeks. Furthermore, we focus on knowledge in the
realm of foreign affairs. Prior research suggests that while it is generally difficult to identify future
outcomes in international affairs (Tetlock, 1998, 1999, 2006), some people appear able to make
accurate predictions (Mellers et al., 2015; Tetlock, 1998, 1992; Tetlock and Gardner, 2016). We do
not look at individual-level factors that correlate with prediction ability, and instead we focus on
whether incentives for accuracy improve people’s ability to make accurate judgments about future
outcomes.
In many ways this is a hard test of responses to financial incentives given that people’s knowledge of and interest in international affairs typically lags behind domestic politics (Converse, 1964;
Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Holsti, 1992; Kinder and Sears, 1985; Lupia, 2015). However, foreign policies can have significant effects on people’s lives and well-being. For example, military
1
In other contexts, some research suggests that participants are more responsive to guaranteed incentives than
uncertain payoffs, even if the expected utility is held constant (Pforr et al., 2015; Warriner et al., 1996; Zheng, Gong
and Pavlou, 2017). However, these other studies have focused on domains very different than ones in which the
incentives increase the potential benefit of cognitive effort and knowledge.
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conflict, international agreements, international trade policies, immigration policies, membership
of international organizations, and economic integration have widespread implications for the economic prosperity and security of domestic populations. The importance of international affairs was
highlighted in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, where immigration and globalization played a
significant role in the campaign.
Figure 1: A Theory of Incentives, Effort, and Knowledge Accuracy.
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Our basic model of how incentives affect knowledge accuracy is displayed in Figure 1. In the
rest of this section we elaborate on both the direct path by which incentives improve accuracy and
the indirect path in which increased effort leads to an increase in knowledge accuracy.

1.1

Effect of Incentives on Effort

Answering questions correctly requires that respondents pay attention to the task and expend
cognitive effort to acquire and use knowledge in making predictions about future events (Lupia
and McCubbins, 1998). Individuals will be more likely to incur these costs if there are benefits for
doing so, and we expect individuals to expend greater effort to make accurate judgments when the
expected benefit of effort increases.
Hypothesis 1 Incentives and Effort Hypothesis
If there are incentives for accuracy, then individuals are more likely to expend effort than in the
absence of incentives.
In our experiment we provide a financial incentive for correct answers, but outside of the experimental context incentives could be any factors that increase the value of accurate knowledge.
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1.2

Effect of Incentives on Knowledge Accuracy

Prior studies show that people respond to financial incentives with improved political knowledge
(Prior and Lupia, 2008); people update their beliefs in response to incentives, even if they are not
perfect Bayesians (Hill, 2017); and incentives for accuracy reduce partisan bias (Prior, Sood and
Khanna, 2015). We expect that incentives lead to improved knowledge accuracy through both the
direct effect of incentives and an indirect effect of greater effort. This leads to the second set of
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2 Incentives and Knowledge Hypothesis
If there are incentives for accuracy, then individuals are more likely to correctly answer questions
than if such incentives are absent.
Hypothesis 3 Incentives and Knowledge Mediation Hypothesis
If there are incentives for accuracy, then individuals are more likely to expend effort than when
there is not an incentive for accuracy and effort will lead to improved accuracy.
Incentives should cause participants to engage in greater effort, and therefore improve knowledge
accuracy compared to participants in the control condition.

2

Experimental Design

We recruited 1016 subjects using Amazon MTurk for the experiment, which we designed to isolate
the effects of incentives on effort and accuracy of answers to political knowledge questions. Previous
research suggests that the MTurk platform produces acceptable samples for social science research
(Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012; Casler, Bickel and Hackett, 2013; Hauser and Schwarz, 2016;
Huff and Tingley, 2015; Levay, Freese and Druckman, 2016; Mullinix et al., 2015).2 We expect our
theory about incentives, effort, and knowledge accuracy to apply to all people, and therefore there
is no reason to expect MTurk respondents to be theoretically inappropriate for our purposes.
2

After an initial pilot study, we implemented an improved experimental design to test the relationship between
incentives, effort, and knowledge accuracy. Further details about the design and the results of the pilot are reported
in Appendix H. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions for improvements in the design.
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The additional advantage of MTurk is that we know subjects are at an internet-connected device
and can search for information, and the platform also provides a way to track how long respondents
take to complete the task, which we can use as a proxy measure for effort. Appendix C presents
descriptive statistics of the sample.
After being recruited via MTurk, but prior to treatment assignment, participants received
background information about the experiment and they answered a series of political information
questions. We used ten political information questions that covered a mix of U.S. domestic issues
and foreign affairs; the questions are displayed in section 1.2.2 in Appendix B. After answering
these questions, respondents were randomly assigned to the control group or one of three treatment
groups.
In Table 1 we report the average number of correct answers to the pre-treatment political
information questions for respondents assigned to each treatment condition. As expected, the
averages do not vary across treatment conditions. We measured pre-existing political information
so that we can use it to contextualize the magnitude of estimated treatment effects by comparing
them to the relationship between prior knowledge and the questions we use as our dependent
variable.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Pre-treatment Political Information, by Treatment.

Control Condition
Bonus Treatment
Random Bonus Treatment
Lottery Treatment
Total

Count
256
256
250
254
1016

Mean
3.707
3.543
3.540
3.531
3.581

Std. Dev.
1.416
1.316
1.383
1.315
1.358

Min.
1
1
1
1
1

Max.
8
7
8
7
8

T-test P-Value
0.175
0.180
0.148

The control group received no incentives for accurate answers. We used three different incentive
schemes in the experiment and held constant the expected value of a right answer to an outcome
question at $0.50. We varied the benefit of a correct answer and the uncertainty associated with
receiving the benefit if a question was answered correctly.
In the bonus treatment participants received a $0.50 guaranteed payment for every correct answer. In the random bonus treatment we randomly selected one of the five questions and paid
respondents $2.50 if they got that particular question correct. In the lottery treatment each participants earned a ticket for a $50 lottery for each correct answer,and one $50 prize was awarded
5

for every 100 correct answers.
We asked comprehension questions about the incentives immediately after exposure to the
treatment but prior to our outcome questions. This helped ensure that participants understood
the bonuses and their likelihood of receiving a bonus given a certain score (Kane and Barabas,
N.d.).
To identify the effect of incentives on effort and knowledge accuracy we chose to examine whether
respondents got the right answer to five different questions that asked about an outcome that would
not be officially known for about five weeks after the respondents were asked to predict the answer
to the question.3 The values for all five questions changed over the five weeks, but because of
lumpiness in the response categories the correct answer changed for only three questions over the
time period of the study.
All questions were multiple choice and the survey required participants to provide a response for
each question to continue the survey. The number of possible responses ranged from six to eleven
responses, which varied according to plausible answers to each question. Table 2 presents the full
text of each question, including the number of possible responses. The entire question wording and
possible responses are available to view in Appendix B.
In all of the conditions participants were allowed and encouraged to search for information to
answer the questions. Making this consistent across conditions allows us to minimize the possibility
that subjects in the treatment conditions inferred that we wanted them to search for information
whereas those in the control condition might not make that inference, and therefore our treatment
effects would be confounded by subjects’ perceptions of what is expected of them.
These outcome questions represent a combination of correct information and the ability to use
it to answer a question about the near-term future. We refer to the ability to answer such question
as knowledge following the distinction between information as data and knowledge as the ability
to make accurate predictions (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998).
Because the correct answer would not be known for five weeks, respondents cannot simply look
up the answers, but the outcomes also do not occur as far into the future as many of the predictions
used in the Good Judgment Project or other forecasting examples.
3

We chose five weeks for both design-based and logistical reasons. We wanted enough time that the current value
might change, but at the same time we needed the timeline to be short enough that respondents would get paid soon
enough to take the incentive seriously.
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Table 2: Knowledge Accuracy Questions and Correct Answers.
No.
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Topic

Question

1

U.S. Jihadist
Attacks

2

Syria Civilian
Deaths

3

Mueller
Indictments

4

U.S. Refugee
Resettlements

5

U.S. Deaths
in Afghanistan

According to New America, a non-partisan think tank, what will be
the figure CLOSEST to the number of Jihadist terrorist attacks
in the U.S. committed by people who were U.S. CITIZENS OR
PERMANENT RESIDENTS at the time of charge or death from
January 1, 2018 to November 30, 2018?
According to IAmSyria.org, a non-profit campaign, what will be the
figure CLOSEST to the number of CIVILIANS KILLED IN THE
SYRIA CONFLICT from January 1, 2018 to November 30, 2018?
Special Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice, Robert Mueller,
is leading an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016
Presidential election. What is the figure CLOSEST to the NUMBER
OF PEOPLE INDICTED OR GIVEN PLEA DEALS in the
investigation as of November 30, 2018?
According to the U.S. Refugee Processing Center, what will be the
figure CLOSEST to the NUMBER OF REFUGEES RESETTLED
IN THE U.S. from January 1, 2018 to November 30, 2018?
According to iCasualties.org, an independent website to track
casualties, what will be the figure CLOSEST to the number of U.S.
MILITARY DEATHS in and around AFGHANISTAN from
January 1, 2018 to November 30, 2018?

Choices

Correct Answer

8

8

6

6,500

8

30

11

20,000

6

10

For Question 1, a participant could search for information about the number of Jihadist terrorist
attacks in the U.S. committed by people who were U.S. citizens or permanent residents at the time
of the experiment, and this would help them answer the question correctly. Some of the possible
answers were either impossible or highly unlikely given the prior number of terrorist attacks, but a
correct answer still requires making a judgment about the number of events in the five weeks before
correct answers were determined. An accurate response may reflect a combination of information
search and the ability to make an inference about how the values will change over the course of five
weeks.4
The short time between asking the outcome questions and paying subjects means that the
correct answers to our questions will necessarily be relatively close to the state of the world when
taking the survey. However, the use of these kinds of questions are not wholly different than some
used in other studies of predictions. For instance, (Tetlock and Gardner, 2016, 125-126) discuss
the following example from their work:
As the Syrian civil war raged, displacing civilians in vast numbers, the IARPA tournament asked forecasters whether “the number of registered Syrian refugees reported
by the United Nations Refugee Agency as of 1 April 2014” would be under 2.6 million.
That question was asked in the first week of January 2014, so forecasters had to look
three months in the future.
Like our questions, this one requires some information about current conditions and the ability
to predict into the short-term future, which requires consideration of the trends underlying the
current state of the world and projecting them forward. The questions we use are neither as easy
as straightforward information questions nor as difficult to answer correctly as predictions with an
18-month time frame.
After the knowledge questions, participants were asked a series of questions relating to effort and
information search.5 The full design, including the treatments, questions, and coding of variables
is presented in Appendix B.
We used two attention checks during the experiment to ensure our subjects were attentive.
4

We thank an anonymous reviewer for this well-made point.
The experiment also featured batteries of political attitude questions, and the results of these are presented in
other papers.
5

8

Almost ninety percent of the sample answered both questions correctly.6
The experiment was launched on October 26, 2018 and participants were paid bonuses on
December 1, 2018.
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Results

In this section, we discuss the results of our experiments. Overall, we find that incentives increase
respondent effort and improve the accuracy of answers to the questions. The effect of incentives
does not appear to vary with their uncertainty.

3.1

Incentives and Effort

Incentives increase the amount of effort expended. Pooled across all treatments, incentives for
accuracy increased effort, measured as time spent on the survey, from a baseline of 10.83 minutes
in the control group to 11.77 minutes across all treatments, an 8.71 percent increase in time spent.
In both the control and treatment groups, subjects were told that they could use the internet to
help them answer the questions correctly so this increase in effort is solely due to the incentives for
accuracy.
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of each individual treatment on effort. The point estimates for the
three treatments are indistinguishable from one another; although the lottery treatment just misses
standard statistical significance levels (p=0.125). These results are consistent with our expectations
by demonstrating that even small incentives increase effort. Furthermore, as expected the increase
in effort does not vary with uncertainty because the expected value of effort is equivalent across
treatments.

3.2

Incentives and Knowledge Accuracy

The experimental results also demonstrate that incentives for accuracy increase the number of
knowledge questions answered correctly. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for knowledge accuracy across the experimental conditions. Pooled across all treatments, incentives for accuracy
improved the number of correct answers by 0.28. On average subjects in the control condition
6

As suggested by Berinsky, Margolis and Sances (2014), we did not drop participants if they failed the screening
questions, but we report the results in Appendix D.
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Figure 2: Determinants of Effort.
Dependent Variable: Time Spent on Survey (minutes).

Point estimates indicate time spent with 95% confidence intervals using coefplot in Stata
(Jann, 2014).
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answered less than one of the five knowledge questions correctly. The modal number of correct
answers was zero in the control group, and it was one in the treatment groups. So, while some
information about the right answers was available online, it is clear that subjects still had a hard
time answering the questions correctly.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Predictive Accuracy, by Treatment.

Control Condition
Bonus Treatment
Random Bonus Treatment
Lottery Treatment
Total

Count
256
256
250
254
1016

Mean
0.797
1.172
0.964
1.091
1.006

Std. Dev.
0.889
1.018
0.995
0.996
0.985

Min.
0
0
0
0
0

Max.
5
4
5
5
5

T-test P-Value
0.000
0.047
0.001

All three incentive conditions led to increased accuracy compared to the control condition.
The bonus treatment increased accuracy by 0.375 correct answers, the random bonus treatment
increased accuracy by 0.167 correct answers, and the lottery treatment increased accuracy by 0.29
correct answers.
Furthermore, the treatment effects are indistinguishable from each other, suggesting they have
the same average effect on behavior. Significantly, Figure 3 illustrates the absence of differences
between treatments on knowledge accuracy — all three incentives led to improved performance.
To put these effect sizes in perspective, we compare the magnitude of the average treatment effect across all three conditions to the estimated magnitude of the relationship between pre-treatment
political information and accurate knowledge in the control group. Our regression estimates indicate that each additional pre-treatment political information question answered correctly increases
by 0.07 the number of knowledge questions answered correctly. Recall that the average treatment
effect across incentive conditions is an increase of 0.28 in the number of correct answers, which is
equivalent to moving from a respondent with an average level of baseline information to a respondent with the highest observed level of baseline political information in our control group.
The results indicate that we may understate both respondents’ willingness to expend effort on a
task, and their ability to correctly answer knowledge questions if we fail to implement the incentive
conditions that best match the theoretical or real-world context being studied.
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Figure 3: Determinants of Knowledge Accuracy.
Dependent Variable: Number of Correct Answers.

Point estimates indicate the number of correct answers with 95% confidence intervals using
coefplot in Stata (Jann, 2014).
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3.3

Incentives, Effort, and Knowledge Accuracy

To determine whether effort mediates the effects of the treatments on the participants’ knowledge
accuracy, we use causal mediation analysis (Imai et al., 2011; Imai, Keele and Yamamoto, 2010).7
Table 4: Direct Treatment Effects and Mediation Effects of Incentives on Knowledge Accuracy.
Mediating Variable: Time Spent on Survey (minutes).

Bonus Treatment
Random Bonus Treatment
Lottery Treatment

ACME
0.053
(0.005, 0.107)
0.034
(-0.001, 0.076)
0.041
(-0.009, 0 .094)

Direct Effect
0.328
( 0.168, 0.484)
0.135
(-0.026, 0.292)
0.271
(0.115, 0.423)

Total Effect
0.382
(0.225, 0.549)
0.170
(0.013, 0.336)
0.312
(0.157, 0.475)

Prop. Total Effect Mediated
0.139
(0.097, 0.237)
0.198
(0.092, 1.246)
0.131
(0.087, 0.262)

The results were calculated using 1000 simulations with 95% confidence intervals in brackets using
mediation in Stata (Hicks and Tingley, 2011).
Table 4 presents the results of causal mediation analysis. Across all treatments, effort appears to
be an important mediator of correct answers. Effort accounts for almost 14 percent of the average
treatment effect of the bonus treatment, nearly 20 percent of the random bonus treatment, and
about 13 percent of the lottery treatment on knowledge accuracy. All three of these estimates are
of similar magnitude, suggesting that the effort induced by the incentives has a similar mediating
effect on knowledge accuracy.
3.3.1

Text Analysis

To further explore the mechanisms influencing knowledge accuracy, we use the structural topic
model stm in R developed by Roberts et al. (2014). Similar to Mildenberger and Tingley (2017),
we examine respondents’ responses to an open-ended question about their thoughts as they made
answered the knowledge questions.8 We identified that seven topics was an appropriate number for
subjects’ responses in the experiment.
We then estimated the difference in the prevalence of each topics between the treatment conditions and the control condition. In comparing each treatment to the control, we consistently found
that only one topic was consistently more common in the treatment than the control, and this topic
was associated with words related to answering questions correctly.
7
8

Appendix F presents the full results of this analysis.
A full discussion of these methods and results are included in Appendix G.
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Figure 4: Effect of Lottery on Free Responses by Respondents
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Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. The plot was created using the stm package in R
(Roberts, Stewart and Tingley, 2018).
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This result is presented visually in Figure 4 in which we plot the seven topics and the estimated
difference for each topic between the lottery condition and the control condition; the topic labels
are based on the most commonly-appearing words for each of the seven topics. The results are
substantively similar for both of the other two treatments.
The text analysis provides further evidence that incentives affect behavior and that the different
incentives are broadly similar in their effects.

4

Discussion

In this paper, we demonstrate that incentives for accuracy increase both effort and the number of
correct answers to knowledge questions about international affairs. Furthermore, our experiment
shows that behavior does not vary with the uncertainty of the accuracy incentive. The results
provide evidence for the importance of understanding the context in which political decisions are
made and have both substantive and methodological importance for political science.
Substantively, individuals may be more capable of understanding and reaching accurate answers
about politics than often found in previous research that uses non-incentivized behavior. Our
results show that measures and estimates of citizen knowledge may be affected by context. People
increase their effort and knowledge about international affairs when given incentives for being
correct. Given the stakes of political decisions (Edlin, Gelman and Kaplan, 2007), there can be
quite large incentives to correctly understand political outcomes. Even though incentives exist in
real political decisions, incentives for accuracy often do not exist in many experiments or survey
settings. The results suggest that when looking at political behavior, we should consider the
extent to which there were incentives for accuracy and how their absence or presence affects our
interpretation of the observed behavior.
The possible mismatch between experimental/survey design and our theories is important for
political behavior scholarship. Beyond the risks of “cheating” in these batteries of knowledge
(Barabas et al., 2014; Clifford and Jerit, 2016), the absence of explicit incentives means our surveys/experiments may not offer appropriate insight into situations in which there is utility associated with making the correct decision. For example, if an experiment focuses on how knowledge
affects voting decisions, then we need to ensure that the experimental context captures the incen-
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tives for accurate knowledge at the ballot box.
Our experiment and results also suggest directions for future studies. First, future research
could introduce explicit costs to searching for information so that we have a better sense of how
the cost of effort affects behavior or measure effort directly through unobtrusive observations of
individuals’ online search behavior and attention to international affairs. Second, the relatively
small incentives in this study could mean we underestimate incentives’ effect. Future studies could
test the effects of larger incentives on individual behavior. Third, incentives to make accurate
judgments may be framed negatively as costs for making mistakes, which could produce systematic
differences in individual behavior (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The general point is that we
still have much to learn about how costs and incentives affect effort, knowledge acquisition and
knowledge accuracy.
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